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RECENT DECISIONS

BANKS AND BANKING - PAYMENT OF CHECK AFTER REVOCATION RIGHT OF DRAWEE TO RECOVER FROM PRESENTER - Defendant draweebank, negligently disregarding a stop-payment order received from drawer on
the previous day, paid a check to a collecting bank. Return of the money was
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immediately demanded, and the collecting bank thereupon refused to forward
it to the next correspondent or to plaintiff payee. In this action by payee, the
collecting bank interpleaded drawee bank. Held, that drawee may recover, for
despite its negligence, the payee had not changed his position and would not
be prejudiced by having to return the inadvertent payment. Foster v. Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, (D. C. Pa. 1939) 29 F. Supp. 716.
, Since a check does not operate as an assignment 1 and may therefore be
revoked by th_e drawer before acceptance, the drawee bank which pays after
revocation cannot, absent special stipulations between these parties,2 charge the
item to the depositor's account.3 Moreover, upon reasoning analogous to that
reputed 4 to support Price v. N eal,5 recovery from the party who received payment is generally denied. 6 In addition to the argument that in such cases payment is made voluntarily and under no mistake of fact since the drawee is bound
to know the status of the depositor'saccount,7 it is contended that-a place and time
for final payment are necessary, that the possibility of having to return the
money is not one of the risks accepted by a holder, and that the use of checks
would otherwise be hampered.8 If, however, when drawee seeks to recover, the
presenter has not changed his position since payment and in reliance thereon, to
deny recovery seems to sponsor a possible windfall for the party paid and to
exact an excessive penalty for a mere blunder.9 Were recovery allowed, it is
not likely that checks would £all into desuetude, or that commerce would be any
more disrupted than it was in Pennsylvania upon the abrogation there of the
rule in Price v. Neal. 10 Nor isit compelling to argue that final payment at some
1 See sec. 189 of the N. I. L., which reads as follows: "A check of itself does not
operate as an assignment of any part of the funds to the credit of the drawer with
the bank, and the bank is not liable to the holder, unless and until it accepts or certifies
the check."
2 As to the effect of stipulations relieving the bank of liability for negligently paying a check following a stop payment order, see 9 A. L. R. 1069 (1920); 5 MICHIE,
BANKS AND BANKING 360-361 (1932).
3 BRADY, BANK CHECKS, 2d ed.,§ 228 (1926); BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, 6th ed., 1158 (1938); see Miller v. Chatham & Phoenix Nat. Bank, 126
Misc. 559, 214 N. Y. S. 76 (1926).
4 Aigler, "Rights of Holder of Bill of Exchange against the Drawee," 38 HARv.
L. REv. 857 at 875, note 65 (1925).
5 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762).
6 5 MICHIE, BANKS AND BANKING 360 (1932); 9 C. J. S. 724 (1938); National
Bank of New Jersey v. Berrall, 70 N. J. L. 757, 58 A. 189 (1904); National Bank of
Commerce v. First Nat. Bank of Coweta, 51 Okla. 787, 152 P. 596 (1915) (no
recovery despite forged indorsement); Johnson v. First State Bank of Rollingstone, 144
Minn. 363, 175 N. W. 612, 9 A. L. R. 960 (1920) (payment partly in drawee's
cashier's checks); Huffman v. Farmer's Nat. Bank, (Tex. Civ. App.) 10 S. W. (2d)
753 (1928); Miller v. Chatham & Phenix: Nat. Bank, 126 Misc. 559, 214 N. Y. S.
76 (1926); Bank of Moulton v. Rankin, 24 Ala. App. 110, 131 So. 450 (1930).
7 National Bank of New Jersey v. Berrall, 70 N. J. L. 757, 58 A. 189 (1904).
8 2 PATON, DIGEST 2331 (1926).
•9 Subrogation of drawee to payee's rights against the drawer, 39 A. L. R. 1239
(1925), would not necessarily, of course, be equivalent to recovery from payee.
1 °For the effect of the abrogating statute, see Colony Trust Co. v. Nat. Bank
of West Pennsylvania, 50_ Pa. Super. 510 (1912), where recovery of payment of forged
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point is _expedient and that a holder does not accept the risk involved in these
situations. Is there any more necessity for final payment when made in negligent disregard of a stop-payment order than when made on a forged indorsement? 11 And is not the risk argument fallacious in its assumption of the conclusion? The drawee's claim has not, however, been universally rejected. Where
a check was twice presented- with payment refused the first time and negligently made the second time-the bank was allowed recovery as against the
payee.12 Another case reached the same result where payment had once been
refused for lack of funds and the party paid was notified of the revocation before
he had got out of sight of the bank.18 But the influence of these holdings, which
point to a seemingly more desirable solution of the problem, are counteracted by
more recent decisions denying recovery even though the presenter had notice
of the revocation before payment/~ and had not changed his position following
payment.15 Possibly the principal case, in which the money was returned to the
drawee albeit no special or unusual factors were working in its favor,1 6 will help
to turn the tide; on the other hand, it may be recognized merely as a reflection
of the increasing liberality of Pennsylvania courts in permitting recovery of
· dvertent payments.11
ma
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instrument was allowed. In First Nat. Bank v. Brule Nat. Bank, 38 S. D. 396, 161
N. W. 616, 12 A. L. R. 1079 (1917), 41 S. D. 87 at 92, 168 N. W. 1054 (1918),
where payment was held absolutely to close the transaction, the court said: "modem
business could not be done on any other basis."
11 Recovery by drawee against recipient of payment on a forged indorsement is
generally permitted. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw, 6th ed., 329 et seq.
(1938). See sec. 23 of the N. I. L.
12 Northampton Nat. Bank v. Smith, 169 Mass. 281 (1897).
18 National Loan & Exch. Bank of Columbia v. Lachovitz, 131 S. C. 432, 128
S. E. 10, 39 A. L. R. 1237 (1925).
u Bank of Moulton v. Rankin, 24 Ala. App. IIO, 131 So. 450 (1930).
15 Miller v. Chatham & Phenix Nat. Bank, 126 Misc. 559, 214 N. Y. S. 76
(1926). A dissenter observed that there was "nothing in the pleadings to show any
change in position on the part of the [payee] or anything to show he was prejudiced."
16 The payee apparently had no notice of revocation. And while it is true that the
money had never reached his hands, the court proceeded on the assumption that he
had been paid.
17 The principal case, at any rate, suggested that there was such a trend in Pennsylvania. Only Meredith v. Haines, 14 Wkly. Notes (Pa.) 364 (1884), and Greenwich
Bank v. Commercial Banking Corp., 85 Pa. Super. 159 (1925), were cited, however.
These cases involved insufficient funds and, in the later case, a suggestion of fraud on
the part of the presenter. Perhaps a general policy favoring recovery can be inferred
from the abrogation of the rule in Price v. Neal. But see First Nat. Bank v. Bode, 74
Prrrs. LEG. J. 577 (1926), a Pennsylvania court of common pleas case, in which it
was held, according to 6 VALE, PENNSYLVANIA DIGEST 141 (1938), that a "Bank cannot recover from payee amount of check which had been honored after notice by
depositor to stop payment."

